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Abstract 
 
Agricultural tillage practices are important human-induced activities that can alter 
carbon emissions from agricultural soils and have the potential to significantly contribute 
to reductions in greenhouse gas emission (Lal et al, 1998). This research investigates the 
expected costs of sequestering carbon in agricultural soils under different subsidy and 
market-based policies. Using the detailed National Resources Inventory data, we estimate 
the probability that farmers adopt conservation tillage practices based on a variety of 
exogenous characteristics and profit from conventional practices. These estimates are 
used with physical models of carbon sequestration to estimate the subsidy costs of 
achieving increased carbon sequestration with alternative subsidy schemes. 
 
JEL classification code: Q38 Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation – Government 
Policy. 
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climatic 
Change (UNFCCC, 1998) proposes to limit future aggregate anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide equivalent greenhouse gas emissions (Article 3.1). The Kyoto Protocol also 
establishes the concept of credits for carbon sinks. These credits can be used to meet a 
country’s emission limitation and reduction commitment. Currently, carbon sinks are 
limited to recent efforts in afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation and do not 
include agricultural soils (Article 3.3). However, Article 3.4 leaves the future inclusion of 
agricultural soils a distinct possibility by stating “…Parties to this Protocol shall…decide 
upon modalities, rules, and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced 
activities related to greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the 
agricultural soils and the land use change and forestry categories shall be added to or 
subtracted from the assigned amounts…”  
Conservation tillage is the primary means of increasing soil carbon. Conservation 
tillage uses crop residue to serve as mulch to protect and increase the soil organic carbon 
(SOC) levels. Conventional tillage systems disturb the soil, leading to oxidation and 
subsequent loss of soil carbon, and leave it unprotected from wind and rainfall, resulting 
in a decrease in SOC levels. Increasing the adoption of conservation tillage will increase 
carbon sequestration rates in agricultural soils and decrease the greenhouse gas emissions 
from the agricultural sector (Lal et al, 1998). 
The purpose of this research is to examine various government and market-based 
instruments to reduce the amount of carbon emissions from agricultural soils through the 
increased adoption of conservation tillage. First, the farmer's adoption decision is 
formally modeled. Next, the design of subsidy and market based instruments are 
discussed with specific focus on the institutions and practices surrounding agricultural 
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policy. Finally, the costs of implementing a variety of subsidy and market based schemes 
are estimated and compared. 
 
A Model of Conservation Tillage Adoption 
and Carbon Sequestration 
In this section, we present a simple adoption model of the farmer's tillage choice and 
a model of changes in carbon soil levels. Carbon sequestration levels will depend on the 
farmer’s choice of tillage practice and the environmental impact of that choice. Hence, 
the expected change in environmental quality from a newly instituted policy depends on 
the increased probability that conservation tillage is adopted and the expected change in 
soil carbon levels. Since both adoption probabilities and the change in carbon levels vary 
across production sites, the site-specific expected change in environmental quality must 
be aggregated across all sites to obtain the aggregate change in expected supply. 
Producers will adopt either a conventional or conservation tillage system when 
growing their crops. Conservation tillage generally lowers fuel, labor, and machinery 
costs more than conventional tillage. Unfortunately, it may also adversely affect yields, 
resulting in lower profits for some farmers. In the absence of subsidies, some farmers will 
find it desirable to adopt conservation tillage practices while others will not. Producers 
are assumed to be risk neutral and hence will adopt the tillage system that maximizes 
expected returns. A rationale for this assumption is that the change in the magnitude of 
risk that occurs from choice of tillage practice relative to the amount of production and 
price risk is quite low. 
Let a superscript “1” denote conservation tillage, and a superscript “0” denote 
conventional tillage. Let 1Eπ denote the expected returns from conservation tillage and 
0π  be the known, average returns from conventional tillage. Thus, a conservation tillage 
system is adopted when the expected returns from conservation tillage exceed the 
expected returns from conventional tillage, i.e., 1 0Eπ π> .  
Since conservation tillage represents a relatively new practice for many farmers, the 
returns from conservation tillage are not always well understood. Thus, we adopt the 
standard assumption that these returns, while known to individual farmers, are not 
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observable to the researcher. However, the expected returns from conventional tillage and 
the choice of tillage system are observable as well as production and geographical 
characteristics such as weather, land, and cropping patterns.  
The expected returns to a farmer from a conservation tillage system are modeled as 
linearly related to the vector of observable production characteristics (x), 
1  E xπ β σε= + , (1) 
where greek letters represent coefficients and e is an additive random error. Let Y = 1 
denote the adoption of conservation tillage and Y = 0  denote the use of conventional 
tillage. The probability of adopting conservation tillage given production characteristics x 
is, 
 
0 1 0 0
0 0
0 0
Pr[ 1 |  , ] Pr[  |  , ]
Pr  |  , 1 Pr  |  , .
Y x E x
x xx x
π π π π
π β π β
ε π ε π
σ σ
= = >
   − −
= > = − ≤      
 (2) 
The error term,ε , is assumed to be logistically distributed. The logistic distribution is 
chosen both for its ease of estimation and its well-known similarity to results from a 
normal distribution (Amemiya, 1981; Maddalla, 1983). So then, 
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0
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0
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π απ β
απ β
+
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%  
The product of these probabilities over the sample forms the likelihood function for 
estimation. Note that the inclusion of expected returns to conventional tillage, as 
suggested by the theoretical model, uniquely identifies the value of the coefficients in the 
logistic estimation. 
Now suppose a payment k is offered to further entice the adoption of conservation 
tillage practices. The adoption will occur if the expected returns from conservation tillage 
plus the payment exceed the expected returns from conventional tillage, i.e., 
1 0E kπ π+ > .  With payments, the probability of adopting conservation tillage practices 
with production characteristics x becomes, 
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The magnitude of carbon emissions from different tillage practices depends upon 
various production and geographical characteristics such as soil, weather, land, and 
cropping history. Suppose there are I different production sites indexed by the subscript i, 
i=1,…,I. Denote the  per acre carbon emissions from the ith production site when using 
conventional and conservation tillage as ( )ixY 0  and ( )ixY1 . With payments, the total 
expected amount of carbon sequestered from the ith production site, ( )0| ,i i iQ k x π , is 
simply the difference between the amount of carbon released into the atmosphere if 
conventional tillage is used minus the expected amount of carbon emitted into the 
atmosphere under the payment, 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )0 0| , 0 1 ,i i i i i i i iQ k x G k x Y x Y x NAπ α π β  = − + − %  (5) 
where NAi is the number of acres at the site. 
 
The Design of Carbon Sequestration Policy for Agriculture 
From the last section, it is clear that different subsidies or payments to farmers will 
generate different carbon sequestration rates. In this section, we present and discuss 
alternative policies that the U.S. government might adopt in response to an agreement by 
the international community to include agricultural sequestration in accounting for 
greenhouse gas reductions. 
Regardless of the policy adopted, the baseline level of soil carbon levels after which 
increases will be counted towards emission reductions will be a critical issue in the role 
that agriculture will play in greenhouse gas reduction efforts. This issue will be resolved 
by international negotiation, although the degree to which the United States is a “large 
player” in that venue may affect the outcome. We suppose that there are two possibilities. 
First, only increments to carbon sequestration levels above the levels observed just before 
the time of adoption of the international agreement will be counted. Thus, credit for 
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carbon emission reductions will be available to agriculture only for carbon reductions 
achieved through new adopters of conservation tillage. The second alternative is that 
credit is given for all carbon sequestered in the soil. Thus, credit for carbon emission 
reductions will be available to all adopters—new or previous adopters. Although at first 
sight, the former approach may seem more appropriate, there is the very real possibility 
that if previous adopters are not credited and able to receive subsidies or payments, they 
will simply plow up their land to become eligible as “new adopters.” Antle et al. (2000) 
and Sandor and Skees (1999) raise this concern. 
The possible alternative designs of a government-based subsidy program to 
encourage the adoption of conservation tillage might be offered under the auspices of the 
current Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). EQIP offers financial, 
educational, and technical assistance where significant natural resource problems, such as 
soil erosion, exist. Two general possibilities exist for the form of the subsidy: 
• a single per acre subsidy, where each producer is offered the same amount of 
subsidy per acre to adopt conservation tillage practices, or  
• a price discriminating or targeted subsidy, where different per acre payments are 
offered to farmers based on their ability to sequester carbon.  
Throughout the remainder of the paper we refer to the first form of subsidy as the 
“single” per acre subsidy and the second as the price discriminating subsidy. In its 
extreme form, and the form we study here, the discriminating subsidy achieves the lowest 
payment cost of sequestering an expected level of carbon. If there are important 
differences in land characteristics and adoption potential across locations and farmers, 
these two subsidies could be associated with vastly different administrative costs and 
payments for acquiring carbon. Although likely infeasible in its purest form (due to the 
need to offer different subsidies to farmers based on their carbon sequestering capability) 
a perfectly discriminating subsidy is of interest since it provides a lower bound on the 
costs of sequestering carbon from agricultural practices (exclusive of the administrative 
costs).  
Other possible EQIP subsidy programs could vary the subsidy payment according to 
the producer’s location and/or crop grown, thus achieving some of the cost saving from 
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differentiation, but at more reasonable administrative costs than the least cost subsidy. By 
focussing on the two endpoints—no differentiation and complete differentiation—this 
analysis provides the range of subsidy payment costs from the most easily administered 
(single subsidy payment) to the most difficult (least cost). 
Formally, a subsidy program is a collection of subsidies, denoted by ( )mnk k= , 
where mnk  is the per acre subsidy offered to the producer at the n
th site growing the mth 
crop. The expected number of acres using conservation tillage practices under an EQIP 
subsidy program k  is denoted as ( )kNA  and equal to,  
( ) ( )( )0
1 1
α π β
= =
= − +∑∑ %m
rM
mn mn mn mn
m n
NA k G k x NA  (7) 
where mnx represents the production characteristics of the n
th site growing the mth crop, 
0
mnπ  is the average return from conventional tillage on the n
th site growing the mth crop, 
M  is the number of crops, and mr  is the number of production sites growing the m
th 
crop. 
The total expected level of carbon sequestration, ( )kQ , is equal to the sum of the 
expected amount of carbon sequestered by each producer, 
( ) ( )0
1 1
| ,
mrM
mn mn mn mn
m n
Q k Q k x π
= =
= ∑∑  (8) 
where mnQ  is the expected supply of carbon from the n
th site growing the mth crop. 
In the case of a single subsidy scheme, mnk k= , for all ( ),m n , each per acre 
payment level will yield a different total amount of carbon sequestered (8). Thus, the 
authority can choose the single per acre subsidy value to achieve the desired expected 
supply of carbon. 
In contrast, the discriminating subsidy scheme will be comprised of a set of differing 
payments that minimize the total expected cost of acquiring a given level of expected 
carbon, Q . The payment minimizing set of subsidies is found by solving, 
mnk
Min ( )( ) ( )0 0
1 1 1 1
| , .
m mr rM M
mn mn mn mn mn mn mn mn mn
m n m n
L k G k x NA Q Q k xα π β λ π
= = = =
 
= − + + −   ∑∑ ∑∑%  (9) 
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The first order condition states that at the minimum1 the expected marginal cost of 
acquiring carbon is equal across all producers and can be written  
( ) ( )
*
* 11
0 1
mn
mn mn mn
k
Y x Y x
λ
ω
   
= +   
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 for  m = 1,…,M ; i = 1,…,rm  (10)  
where ( ) ( )
mn
mn
mn
G k
k G
ω
 ∂ ⋅ 
= =  ∂ ⋅   
 elasticity of adoption. 
The variable *λ  represents the optimal expected marginal cost of acquiring carbon, 
and *mnk  represents its optimal subsidy. As indicated, the optimal subsidy offered to 
producers depends upon their willingness to adopt conservation tillage practices and their 
ability to sequester carbon through conservation tillage practices. The elasticity of 
adoption ( )mnω  represents a producer’s willingness to adopt conservation practices. The 
greater the elasticity of adoption, the greater the increase in the probability of adopting 
conservation tillage for a marginal increase in the subsidy. Per acre differences in the 
amount of carbon emissions between conventional and conservation tillage 
( ) ( )( )0 1mn mnY x Y x−  represents the producer’s ability to sequester carbon. 
The need to provide a different subsidy for each farmer may initially appear at odds 
with the standard environmental economics result that efficient allocations are achieved 
with a constant payment per unit of emissions. However, the subsidy scheme discussed 
here is not based directly on emissions, but rather on an acre basis. To the extent that 
different acres have different emission reduction potential, different levels of subsidies 
are necessary to achieve efficiency.  
In addition to choosing between a single subsidy and a discriminating subsidy, the 
government must decide whether existing adopters will be eligible for subsidies or 
whether only new adopters will be eligible. Although a subsidy scheme that only pays 
new adopters will clearly be much cheaper, it is unclear whether such a subsidy scheme is 
viable. First there is the question of fairness—strong arguments are likely to be made that 
farmers who adopted environmentally beneficial practices early should not be penalized 
for doing so. Second, there is an important efficiency concern. If the subsidy scheme is 
developed such that only new adopters are eligible, all farmers have an incentive to 
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become a “new” adopter. This can be achieved by existing adopters by converting to 
conventional tillage practices for a year, thereby releasing most of their stored carbon 
reserves into the atmosphere. Clearly this is not an efficient outcome and it could be 
avoided by paying all adopters. 
The preceding discussion has been framed in terms of subsidy schemes; however, 
many of the issues discussed would be directly relevant to a carbon permit market. In 
such a market, producers might receive carbon credits from the government, redeemable 
in an organized carbon market outside of the agricultural sector. Given the market price 
of carbon, producers could either sell their carbon credits and use conservation tillage 
practices or keep their carbon credits and use conventional practices. For such a market to 
work in agriculture, there must, of course, be a well functioning carbon market in sectors 
outside of agriculture.  
 Again, the setting of the baseline against which improvements are measured will be 
an important determinant in the potential magnitude of this market. If the baseline is set 
such that only newly sequestered carbon can count toward the international agreement 
limits, then it would make sense to design the market such that farmers are given credits 
only to cover new adoption. Thus, farmers already having adopted conservation tillage 
practices would not receive any credits. In contrast, if the baseline is set at zero, farmers 
would receive carbon credits equal to the total carbon potential of their land, regardless of 
whether they had previously adopted or not.  
Likewise, the issue of spatial heterogeneity is equally relevant. A credit program 
could conceptually be set up such that each farmer received credits equal to the specific 
carbon potential of their land, accounting for soil characteristics, historical cropping 
patterns, weather, etc. This would correspond to our price discriminating subsidy scheme. 
Alternatively, each acre could be given a fixed amount of credit, regardless of its 
characteristics. This would correspond to the single subsidy scheme. 
 
Estimation of the Tillage Adoption Model 
The study region consists of the state of Iowa, where there is good data on tillage 
practices, returns to conventional tillage, and land characteristics. Further, Iowa soil has 
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been identified as soil with very high potential for carbon sequestration (Mitchell, 1997). 
The crops in the analysis are corn, soybeans, wheat, sorghum, and hay and fourteen major 
rotations were identified (Babcock et al., 1997). The primary data source is the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Resource Conservation Service’s National 
Resource Inventory (NRI) conducted at 13,477 points in the study area. For each NRI 
point, information is collected on the natural resource characteristics of the land, the 
farming practices used by the producer, and weather characteristics. The NRI data are 
supplemented by constructed net returns and climate data. 
Two samples were used in the empirical analysis: the whole sample for the study 
region, and a random sub-sample. First, the logit model of conservation tillage adoption 
was estimated on a random sub-sample (1,343 points) drawn from NRI points located in 
the study region. Second, the probabilities of conservation tillage adoption under 
different subsidy schemes and the expected levels of carbon sequestration were predicted 
on the whole NRI sample for the study region (13,477 points). 
Table 1 presents the variables used in the estimation of the conservation tillage 
adoption model. All data are for the 1992-growing season. As can be seen from the table, 
62 percent of farmers already use conservation tillage. These farmers have chosen to 
adopt conservation tillage in the absence of subsidies, presumably because the net benefit 
of conservation tillage on their farms is positive (the lower expected yields are more than 
offset by lower costs of production). 
The expected net returns from conventional tillage, 1Eπ , are distinguished by crop in 
Table 1 and are those realized in 1992. Since returns data are not available from the NRI 
data, we assigned the net returns data to each sample point based on the production 
region, 1992 crop, and 1991 crop information. To construct the regional returns data, we 
combined county-specific average yield data (USDA/NASS, 1994), state-specific price 
data (USDA/NASS, 1999), and the region-, tillage-, and rotation-specific cost data from 
Mitchell (1997). The sample average net returns to conventional tillage in corn 
production is about $145/acre, in soybeans about $110/acre and about $92/acre for all 
other crops. A dummy variable indicating a crop other than corn or soybeans (“other 
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crops”) is included to account for the somewhat idiosyncratic nature of these other 
choices (over 90 percent of Iowa is planted in corn or soybeans). 
Climatic data were constructed for the usual crop growing seasons as reported in 
USDA/NASS (1997), from 1975–1994 temperature and precipitation data collected by 
the National Climatic Data Center (Earthinfo, 1995). The remaining variables used are 
indicators of land characteristics that have been identified as either favorable to or 
difficult for conservation tillage practices. The impact of natural soil and climate 
conditions on conservation tillage adoption depends on two factors: (a) whether there is 
an identified need for conservation efforts to sustain agricultural production, and/or  
(b) whether conservation tillage can provide physical soil condition benefits as compared 
to conventional tillage. The first factor refers to adoption of conservation tillage to 
prevent losses associated with a long-term use of conventional tillage, while the second 
factor refers to gains associated with the conservation tillage adoption. 
Regarding the first factor, one would expect a wider adoption of conservation tillage 
on the lands prone to wind and water erosion. As for the second factor, field experiments 
show that an increase in the amount of crop residue cover on the soil surface tends to 
keep soils cooler, wetter, less aerated, and denser (eg., Allmaras and Dowdy, 1985; Uri, 
1999). Consequently, wider adoption of conservation tillage is expected on the soils 
where these effects are desirable. 
Table 2 presents the estimated influence of each of these variables on the probability 
of adopting conservation tillage as well as the standard error. The estimated net returns 
coefficients suggest that the standard deviation of the returns to conservation tillage is 
about $150 for corn and $130 for soybeans. While high compared to the conventional 
tillage returns reported in Table 1, it is important to keep in mind that the true variability 
of the returns to conventional tillage is higher as the returns were averaged over 
individual farmers in constructing the data. 
Estimates of the effect of soil and climatic conditions on conservation tillage 
adoption are reasonable. Land slope is the amount of inclination of the soil surface from 
the horizontal expressed as the vertical distance divided by the horizontal distance. The 
slope is one of the key factors affecting land susceptibility to soil erosion, which in turn, 
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should affect adoption of conservation techniques. As expected, we found a statistically 
significant positive relationship between this variable and the probability of adoption, a 
result consistent with earlier studies of Wu and Babcock (1998) and Uri (1998). 
Soil permeability (the rate at which water can pass through a soil material) and 
available water capacity (the amount of water that a soil can store in a form available for 
plant use) are both positively related to better drainage of the soil, which in turn, is found 
to positively affect yields under conservation tillage systems (see, for example, a 
discussion in Allmaras and Dowdy, 1985). Thus, the found strong positive effects of these 
variables on conservation tillage adoption are in agreement with agronomic and soil 
science knowledge. 
The NRI uses a standard land capability classification, in which soils are classified 
based on their capability for sustained production of cultivated crops and pasture plants 
(Troeh and Thompson, 1993). Under this classification, the land of Class I, being the best 
land with no serious limitations for cultivation, does not have immediate conservation 
needs. As expected, we found a strong negative effect of the Class I land indicator variable 
on the probability of conservation tillage adoption. A similar effect is reported in Uri 
(1998). 
The effect of climatic variables on conservation tillage adoption is also consistent 
with agronomic science. As the soils tend to stay cooler and wetter with the reduced 
tillage, it was expected the conservation tillage be adopted easier in warmer regions and 
in regions with relatively less variable precipitation. The strong positive effect of the 
average daily maximum temperature and the opposite one of the average daily minimum 
temperature are in agreement with the expectations. The statistically significant negative 
effect of precipitation variability on  adoption is consistent with a higher need for 
adequate soil drainage under reduced till. 
 
Costs of Sequestering Carbon 
In addition to the adoption model just discussed, the empirical analysis relies on the 
Site-Specific Pollution Production (SIPP) modeling system (Mitchell et al., 1997), which 
estimates the environmental effects of different management practices. The estimation of 
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these systems used information from the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC) 
(Sharpley and Williams, 1988), the NASS and NRI databases (USDA/SCS, 1990), the 
USDA’s Census of Agriculture, Cropping Practices Survey, and Crops County data 
(Babcock et al., 1997). The SIPP model is used here to estimate the difference in carbon 
emissions from conventional and conservation tillage. For this analysis, conventional 
tillage is defined as a tillage system that maintains less than 30 percent residue cover. 
Conservation tillage is assumed to be no-till and is defined as a tillage system that 
maintains at least 70 percent residue cover (CTIC, 1993). 
To assess the costs of the alternative subsidy schemes outlined in section 2, we 
compute the total cost of achieving a given level of carbon sequestration in two 
alternative ways: 
( ) ( )( )0
1
N
i i i i i
i
TC k G k x k NAα π β
=
= − + ⋅ ⋅∑ %  (11) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }0 0
1
N
i i i i i i i
i
TC k G k x G x k NAα π β απ β
=
∆ = − + − + ⋅ ⋅∑ % % , 
where ( )TC k represents the total cost of a particular set of subsidies when the subsidy 
payments are made to all adopters, regardless of whether they had previously adopted. In 
contrast, ( )TC k∆  is the cost of a subsidy (or permits) program that would pay only new 
adopters. The expected total amount of carbon sequestered may also be computed in two 
ways, as ( )Q k  or ( )Q k∆ : 
( ) ( )( ) ( )0
1
0( ) 1( )
N
i i i i i i
i
Q k G k x Y x Y x NAα π β
=
= − + ⋅ − ⋅∑ % , (12) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } ( )0 0
1
0( ) 1( )α π β απ β
=
∆ = − + − + ⋅ − ⋅∑ % %N i i i i i i i i
i
Q k G k x G x Y x Y x NA , 
 
where ( )Q k corresponds to the total amount of carbon sequestered and would be the 
appropriate measure of sequestered carbon if the baseline is set such that total carbon 
storage is counted. Alternately, ( )Q k∆  is the expected total amounts of carbon 
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sequestered due to the switch from conventional to conservation tillage and would be 
appropriate if the baseline allows only new carbon storage to be counted.  
The quantities (11) and (12) have been estimated using all 13,477 1992 NRI points 
located in Iowa, where the crop grown in 1992 was corn, soybeans, wheat, sorghum, or 
hay. The adoption probabilities are predicted from the estimated model, and the value of 
0( ) 1( )i iY x Y x− has been predicted using the meta-model developed by Mitchell et al. 
(1997). The values iNA equal the NRI expansion factors. The latter, by definition, are the 
weights that ensure proper aggregation to the state cropland totals (Nusser and Goebel, 
1997). 
These expressions provide the basis for computing the average cost of sequestered 
carbon for the subsidy/credit programs identified earlier. In particular, we compute the 
average cost per ton of sequestered carbon under the following subsidy/market scenarios: 
1. A single per acre subsidy, payments made to all adopters,  
( ) ( )and ,
( ) ( )∆
TC k TC k
Q k Q k
  
2. A single per acre subsidy, payments made only to new adopters,  
( ) ( )and ,
( ) ( )
∆ ∆
∆
TC k TC k
Q k Q k
 
3. A price discriminating subsidy, payment to all adopters,  
( *) ( *)and ,
( *) ( *)∆
TC k TC k
Q k Q k
 and 
4. A price discriminating subsidy, payment to new adopters,  
( *) ( *)and ,
( *) ( *)
∆ ∆
∆
TC k TC k
Q k Q k
 
where k* represents the vector of minimum payment subsidies and k  represents the 
single subsidy level. Note that the average costs are reported two ways for each subsidy 
level, one assuming an allowable baseline of only the additional carbon sequestered over 
previous levels (DQ(.)) in the denominator) and the other allowing all carbon (Q(.)). 
Clearly the average costs of carbon sequestered will be much lower if the costs can be 
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averaged over the entire stock of carbon stored in the soil, rather than the increment 
attributable solely to the subsidy.  
Figure 1 shows the average costs of the four subsidy programs under the assumption 
that credit for carbon sequestered is provided only for the increment in carbon levels 
(DQ). As expected the single subsidy paying all adopters is by far the most expensive. 
Likewise, the cost of the price discriminating subsidy is quite high when all adopters 
must be paid. However, both subsidy schemes have much lower per unit costs when only 
new adopters are paid, as represented by the lower two curves. In this case, about 1 mmt 
of carbon can be acquired for $190 from a discriminating subsidy and $270 from a single 
subsidy. These values are close to SOC valuation by agronomists (Lal, 1998). 
It is important to recognize that the social costs are the same whether only new 
adopters or all adopters are paid (and are represented by the lower curves) as the 
difference is merely a transfer. However, when considering the governmental costs of a 
subsidy program of the amount of money that might flow into agriculture as a result of a 
carbon market, the difference is of real interest. 
Figure 2 reports the results for the same four sets of subsidy schemes, but under the 
scenario in which total carbon sequestered is included in the baseline. In this situation, 
average costs are dramatically lower (note the difference in the scale used both on the 
vertical and on the horizontal axis). Under any of the four subsidies, but particularly those 
that pay only new adopters, agriculture is predicted to be very competitive in being able 
to supply carbon reductions at low prices. Note, that the curves on Figure 2, are the 
average not marginal cost curves. Consequently, they are not the aggregate carbon supply 
schedules. 
Finally, note that the difference between the single and discriminating subsidy 
decreases as the amount of carbon supply increases because the amount of flexibility in 
the minimum cost program declines. This loss of flexibility arises because as carbon 
supply increases there are fewer and fewer low-cost providers of carbon and fewer and 
fewer producers who are selling their fixed supply of carbon to the market. 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to examine various policy instruments that promote 
carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions through 
increased adoption of conservation tillage. The expected cost of carbon sequestration was 
estimated for four subsidy programs under two baseline scenarios.  
Although the lowest payment cost can be achieved by a price discriminating subsidy, 
such a scheme may not be viable, either politically or due to prohibitively high 
administrative and enforcement costs. However, subsidies that permit some 
differentiation are very common in agriculture (such as the EQIP and Conservation 
Reserve Program [CRP]), thus investigating the least cost approach provides a useful 
lower bound on the costs of a subsidy scheme. In contrast, a single subsidy is less 
efficient, but will have lower administrative and political costs.  Results of this study 
indicate that the payments associated with a price discriminating subsidy will be up to 4.1 
times lower than a single price subsidy.  
The average cost per ton of carbon sequestered through conservation tillage practices 
is largely affected by the choice of a baseline regardless of whether a single or price 
discriminating subsidy is used. Likewise, costs are much higher when payments must be 
made to all farmers employing conservation tillage, rather than just those adopting anew 
in response to the subsidy. Although neither result is surprising, it is important to 
understand the magnitude of these differences when considering the alternative policy 
design. 
Several important limitations to this research should be mentioned at this juncture. 
First, as described in the empirical analysis, the estimates are based on meta-models 
using EPIC model simulations of carbon in agricultural soils. Improved estimates of the 
carbon sequestration potential are currently being developed using the more accurate 
CENTURY model. The cost estimates reported here may be sensitive to the carbon 
estimates from these physical models. Second, the results presented here apply to Iowa, 
where relatively high adoption rates are already present. They may not generalize well to 
other states or regions where different soil characteristics, weather, and other factors are 
present.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics for variables in the logit estimation a  
 
Variable 
 
Units 
 
Sample 
Mean 
Sample 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Conservation tillage  
   (1-yes, 0-no) 
Number 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Net returns to conventional  
   tillage, corn b 
$ per acre 145 23 67 185 
Net returns to conventional  
   tillage, soybeans c 
$ per acre 109 14 68 141 
Net returns to conventional  
   tillage, other crops d,e 
$ per acre 92 43 -40 158 
Other crop (1-other crop d,  
   0-soybeans or corn) 
Number  0.08 0.27 0 1 
Soil surface texture (2-fine,  
   1-medium, 0-coarse) 
Number 0.6 1.2 0 2 
Land slope Percent 4.1 3.9 0.1 26.0 
Soil permeability Inches per hour 1.71 2.18 0.03 20.00 
Soil available water  
   capacity 
Percent 18.4 2.8 4.0 31.0 
Class I land (1-yes, 0-no) Number 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Mean of the daily 
   maximum temperature 
   during the corn growing 
   season  
Fahrenheit 78.7 1.8 72.9 82.4 
Mean of the daily 
   minimum temperature  
   during the corn growing  
   season 
Fahrenheit 55.6 2.0 50.0 59.8 
Mean of the daily  
   precipitation during the  
   corn growing season 
Inches 0.141 0.012 0.114 0.173 
Standard deviation of the  
   daily precipitation during  
   the corn growing season 
Inches 0.331 0.027 0.276 0.417 
a 1,343 observations 
b 765 observations 
c 475 observations 
d wheat, sorghum, or hay 
e 103 observations 
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Table 2. Maximum -likelihood estimates for parameters of the logit model 
    
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error of Estimator a 
Net returns to conventional 
   tillage, corn 
β1 -0.0121 0.0029* 
 
 
  
Net returns to conventional  
   tillage, soybeans 
β2 -0.0136 0.0039* 
 
 
  
Net returns to conventional  
   tillage, other crops 
β3 -0.0018 0.0051 
 
 
  
Other crop dummy β4 -2.87 0.66* 
 
 
  
Soil surface texture β5 -0.114 0.062*** 
 
 
  
Land slope β6 0.029 0.017*** 
 
 
  
Soil permeability β7 0.070 0.038*** 
 
 
  
Soil available water capacity β8 801 305* 
 
 
  
Class I land β9 -0.34 0.19*** 
 
 
  
Mean of the daily maximum 
   temperature during the corn  
   growing season  
β10 0.135 0.038* 
 
 
  
Mean of the daily minimum  
   temperature during the corn  
   growing season  
β11 -0.147 0.048* 
 
 
  
Mean of the daily precipitation  
   during the corn growing season  
β12 27.0 9.9* 
 
 
  
Standard deviation of the daily  
   precipitation during the corn  
   growing season  
β13 -16.8 4.4* 
    
Fraction of correct predictions 
 
0.67  
 
 
  
Log (Likelihood)  -864.0  
 
a  The standard errors are computed from analytic second derivatives. 
*, **, and *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Figure 1.  Expected Per Ton Cost of Sequestering Carbon Under Different Subsidy Schemes. 
Credit for the Carbon Sequestered due to the Subsidy Only.
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Figure 2.  Expected Per Ton Cost of Sequestering Carbon Under Different Subsidy Schemes. 
Credit for All Carbon Sequestered.
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Endnote 
 
1. The second order condition for a minimum is not met globally, since the adoption 
function ( )( )0G k xα π β− + % may be either concave or convex in k. A grid search was 
conducted to find the value of *λ that minimized the total expected costs of sequestering 
an expected level of carbon. 
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